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THE MERGER DOCTRINE, CONTEMPORANEOUS FELONY
AGGRAVATORS, AND INTUITIVE FAIRNESS
Wes Dutcher- Walls
"Is there not something terribly amiss when such highly-educated jurists spend their time pars-
ing the lexicon of death, arguing over . .. 'aggravating' and 'mitigating' circumstances as human lives-
already shattered by abuse, poverty, and the isolation ofprison ife-literally hang in the balance?"
- John D. Bessler'
This article examines two distinct but related forms of disproportionality in the law of capi-
tal murder. First, this article will examine what it calls "guilt disproportionality," which stems from
the effect of the merger doctrine as an inherent limit on the scope of felony murder liability. By
excluding the most violent felons who have committed the most assaultive acts from felony murder
liability - on the grounds that their felonies "merge" with the eventual accidental homicide - the
merger doctrine counterintuitively results in felons who are relatively less violent being eligible for
the death penalty. This article will engage with two scholarly attempts to rationalize and define the
merger doctrine: the "redescriptive" test and the "dual culpability" test. As discussed below, the
"dual culpability" test is more promising not only as a fairer definition of merger but also because
it offers a conceptual framework which can be re-applied at the sentencing phase of capital felony
murder trials.
Second, this article will explore the concept of what it calls "sentencing disproportionality,"
which refers to the higher likelihood that murderers convicted on a felony murder theory will
receive the death penalty relative to those convicted on a premeditation theory. This is because
of the existence of "contemporaneous felony" aggravating circumstances (the "CF aggravator") in
many state capital sentencing statutes. The CF aggravators work by making first-degree murders
to be "aggravated" - and therefore eligible for the death penalty - if the murder was committed
during any of an enumerated list of felonies. After reviewing examples of Equal Protection Clause
challenges to the "contemporaneous felony" aggravator from Florida in the 1980s, this essay will
argue that a "duplication" challenge based on Lowenfield c. Phelps is a preferable way to under-
stand and challenge the disproportionately adverse effects of this aggravating circumstance on
those convicted of first-degree murder on a felony murder theory. Drawing on the dissent of Jus-
tices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall in Lowenfielc this article re-applies Guyora Bind-
er's "dual culpability" theory in the capital sentencing context to argue that the "contemporaneous
felony" aggravator should not apply when a first-degree murder conviction rests solely on a felony
murder theory.3 Throughout, this article uses Florida, its sentencing statute, and its state court
jurisprudence to examine these concepts.
' John D. Bessler, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS' EIGHTH AMENDMENT 256
(2012).
2 See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 255 (1988) (Brennan and Marhsall, JJ., dissenting).
See Guyora Binder, Making the Best ofFelonyMurder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403, 522 (2011).
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"Disproportionality" takes on two dif-
ferent meanings, each more precise than a
general sense of a punishment too severe for
the crime, when we identify two separate pre-
sumptions about proportional sentencing in
the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital
trial. In the context of "guilt disproportional-
ity," addressed in Part II, this article uses "dis-
proportionality" to describe the effect of the
merger doctrine in excluding what may appear
as more morally culpable felonies -such as ag-
gravated assault-from the pool of available
predicate felonies, while allowing felonies like
robbery to be predicates for felony murder.
As Finkelstein succinctly notes, the merger
doctrine "has the effect of making it easier for
prosecutors to prosecute [for felony murder]
defendants who have committed less severe
crimes, as compared with those who have com-
mitted more serious ones."4 Similarly, Binder
suggests that, from the perspective of mor-
al views on fairness and proportionality, the
limitation of "assaultive" offences from being
predicate felonies becomes less compelling as
those offences become more dangerous or vi-
olent.5 The comparison underlying "guilt dis-
proportionality" is amongst defendants who
committed felonies in which an accidental kill-
ing resulted: those defendants who committed
assaultive and therefore "merge-eligible" are
one group and those defendants who com-
mitted non-assaultive felonies that cannot be
merged are the comparator group.
' Claire Finkelstein, Merger and Felony Murder, in
DEFINING CRIMES: ESSAYS ON THE SPECIAL PART OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 219, 219 (R.A. Duff and Stuart Green
eds., 2005).
' Binder, supra note 3, at 522.
In the context of "sentencing dispropor-
tionality," discussed in Part III, this article uses
"disproportionality" to describe the adverse
effects of the "contemporaneous felony" factor
(the "CF aggravator") on offenders convicted of
first-degree murder on a felony murder theo-
ry. Here, the comparison is amongst a narrower
pool of defendants: those convicted of first-de-
gree murder- either on a premeditation or fel-
ony murder theory- from the perspective of an
offender about to enter the sentencing phase
of a bifurcated capital trial. Those defendants
convicted on a premeditation theory are one
group, and those convicted on a felony murder
theory are the comparator group.
II
"GUILT" DISPROPORTIONALITY
AND THE MERGER DOCTRINE
Felony Murder in the United States
Felony murder in this article refers to
the theory upon which a defendant can be
convicted of first-degree murder on the basis
of even an accidental homicide that took place
during a felony, even without a finding of any
particular nens rea towards the resulting death.
There are varying requirements as to the de-
gree to which the killing must be related to the
felony; for example, it is generally required that
the killing be "in furtherance" of the felony.6
However, with regard to the concept of "guilt
disproportionality," the focus here is on the
processes by which some felonies may serve as
predicates for felony murder convictions and
others may not.
6 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Murder After the Merger: A
Commentary on Finkestein, 9 Buff Crim. L. Rev. 561, 563
(2006); see also Binder, supra note 3, at 518.
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Forty-five states have a felony murder
provision in their murder statutes.7 One reason
this essay focuses on Florida as a site of analysis
is that its murder statute has a particularly long
list of potential predicate felonies for the pur-
poses of the felony murder theory. Florida lists
at least nineteen predicates in § 782.04(1)(a)(2),
whereas North Carolina, for example, lists only
six predicates with a catchall category for other
felonies committed with a weapon in its statute.8
Regardless of its scope, felony murder remains
a controversial criminological theory. Guyo-
ra Binder suggests that advocates of the felony
murder rule see it as "work[ing] in conjunction
with other rules of criminal liability to map a
particular society's moral intuitions about vio-
lence and malice."9 Similarly, Claire Finkelstein
notes that "one of the most common rationales
offered for felony murder is the advantage it af-
fords the state in meeting its deterrence goals.""o
Critics of felony murder often empha-
size its incongruity in a modern, rational penal
code. For example, Justice William Brennan of
the United States Supreme Court, in a dissent
to a decision upholding accomplice felony mur-
der, wrote that felony murder is a "living fossil.""
Sudduth goes further, claiming that it is a "bar-
baric anachronism."12 However, more important-
ly for the purposes of this article, criticisms of
the felony murder rule may often be expressed
in the terms of proportionality and dispropor-
Binder, supra note 3, at 544.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.041)(a)(2) (West 2016); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-17(a) (West 2013).
* Guyora Binder, The Origins of the American Felony
Murder Rule, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 207 (2004).
10 Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 228.
" Norman J. Finkel and Stefanie E Smith,Princ pals
andAccessories in Capital Felony-Murder: the Proportion-
alityPrincjple Reigns Supreme, 27 L. & Soc'y REV. 129, 132
(1993).
12 Tamu Sudduth, The Dillon Dilemma: Finding Propor-
tionateFelony-MurderPunishments, 27 CAL. L. REV. 1299,
1326 (1984).
tionality. There is experimental research sug-
gesting that the public views the death penal-
ty as a disproportionate punishment for felony
murder.'" A Yale Law Journal editorial comment
from 1957 argues that the "indiscriminate group-
ing of crimes characterized by a specific design
to kill with crimes marked by the commission of
a felony undermines the principle of culpability
based on mental state," and therefore that felo-
ny murder should be abolished." Further, major
constitutional challenges to the imposition of
the death sentence for felony murder center on
disproportionality, in some cases with success, as
inEnrnund c. Florida, where the Court reversed a
death sentence for a getaway car driver convict-
ed on an accomplice theory of liability for felony
murder: "the Court clearly intended to protect a
defendant convicted of felony murder from suf-
fering a punishment hat was cruel and unusual
because of its disproportionality."'5 The Califor-
nia Commission on the Fair Administration of
Justice, in its 2008 final report, recommended
that first-degree murder on a felony murder
theory should no longer result in eligibility for
the death penalty.'6 Below, this article will pro-
pose the more modest reform of prohibiting the
consideration of the CF aggravator when the
first-degree murder conviction is based on a fel-
ony murder theory, reflecting the ideal of "dual
culpability" sentencing. The California Commis-
sion has recommended this reform in the alter-
native for jurisdictions which chose to retain
felony murder as a capital crime.
1 Finkel and Smith, supra note 11, at 134.
1 Case Comment, Felony Murder as a First Degree
Offence: An Anachronism Retained, 66 YALE L.J. 427, 433
(1957).
" Douglas W. Schwartz, Imposing the Death Sentence for
Felony Murder on a Non-Triggerman, 105 STAN. L. REV.
857, 866 (1985); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982).
16 CAL. COMM. ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., FINAL REPORT
at 138-39 (2008).
" Id. at 139.
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The merger doctrine
Given the concerns over the potential
disproportionality caused by the felony murder
rule, scholarship has focused on its structural
and theoretical limits. The merger doctrine is
an important example of these limits.' It oper-
ates by disqualifying felonies such as aggravat-
ed assault or manslaughter from being felony
murder predicates because they are too similar
to the accidental killing itself. This principle
extends back to the "intellectual birth" of the
felony murder doctrine.'9 A merger doctrine
of some kind is generally seen as necessary for
preserving the integrity of a graded homicide
scheme: without it, all homicidal felonies in-
cluding manslaughter would become murder,20
and prosecutors could uniformly bring first-de-
gree murder charges on a felony murder theory
to sidestep the question of muens rea and pre-
clude the defendant from using defenses such
as provocation.2 '
The "redescriptive" test
Some scholars have attempted to artic-
ulate rationales for the merger doctrine or re-
formulate the doctrine itself to satisfy post hoc
justifications for it. The prescriptive or norma-
tive disagreement over the value of the doc-
trine is tied up with a descriptive or analytical
disagreement over what the doctrine actually is,
and how it does or should operate. For example,
Claire Finkelstein sees the merger doctrine as
a requirement that the offender engage in two
separate "acts" in order to be liable for felony
murder.22 Accordingly, in articulating her own
1 David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defence of
the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y REV.
359, 377 (1985); see also Binder, supra note 9, at 186.
1 Binder, supra note 9, at 90.
20 Crump & Crump, supra note 17, at 378.
21 Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 227.
22 Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 229.
concept of the merger doctrine, she rejects the
prevailing "independent felonious purpose" test
and puts forward what she calls the "redescrip-
tive" test.23 Under this formulation of merger, a
predicate felony will merge only when the "act
in virtue of which the defendant satisfies the
offence definition for the predicate felony can
itself be redescribed in terms of the resulting
death," therefore failing felony murder's two-act
requirement.24 [Emphasis added.] To provide a
limiting principle,25 Finkelstein suggests that the
causal relationship needed to satisfy the "rede-
scriptive" test is broken by "unusual interven-
tions" such as another person's actions.26
Importantly, Finkelstein presents the
"redescriptive" test in the language of intuitive
conceptions of fairness: the test will produce
"fairly intuitive results for a range of cases. "27
She goes on to suggest hat there should be "no
objection to allowing lesser felonies to serve as
the predicate [for felony murder]" as long as
they cannot be redescribed as the killing it-
self, even if they are not inherently dangerous. In
light of these statements, Finkelstein lays out
a striking sampling of the results of her "rede-
scriptive" test: both assaulting and starving a
child to death could be "redescribed" as-and
merged into -the ultimate killing, but entering
a home with the intent to assault could not be
"redescribed" as a resulting accidental death,
and thus could result in felony murder liabil-
ity.28
Finkelstein's attempt to justify the merg-
er doctrine as she defines it through an appeal
to intuitive senses of proportionality appears
less than completely successful. Ferzan and
21 Id. at 223, 229.
24 Id. at 230.
21 See id. at 231; see also Ferzan, supra note 6, at 565.
26 Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 234.
21 Id. at 230.
21 Id. at 236.
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Binder criticize Finkelstein for what Ferzan
calls the "false conceptual premise" that fel-
ony murder requires two acts.29 Further, both
note how Finkelstein's test could exclude par-
adigmatic felony murder predicates such as
robbery and rape3 0 or even arson.3 ' Disputing
Finkelstein's claim to intuitive fairness, Ferzan
suggests that the "redescriptive" test would in
fact result in "counterintuitive results in para-
digmatic cases."32
A unifying theory: dual culpability
A preferable test for the merger doc-
trine is the "independent culpability" or "dual
culpability" test set out by Binder.3 In brief,
Binder's test requires either an independent
culpable purpose-that is, a purpose of harm-
ing some interest other than physical integrity
of the eventual victim-or simply a knowing
acceptance of or reckless indifference towards
an independent harm . Whereas Finkelstein's
merger doctrine requires two acts for felony
murder, Binder's merger doctrine requires two
forms of culpability.35 In most cases of felony
murder, these two culpabilities are an indiffer-
ence to the risk of death and an intent towards
the felony.36 As a preliminary matter, this em-
phasis on individual culpability seems to align
more comfortably with the emphasis on mor-
al blameworthiness in seeking proportionality
than Finkelstein's ontological -linguistic pars-
ing of the defendant's outward actions.
2' Ferzan, supra note 6, at 562; Binder, supra note 3, at
522.
3o Binder, supra note 3, at 522.
31 Ferzan, supra note 6, at 567.
32 Id. at 576.
3 Binder, supra note 3, at 521.
Id. at 519-20.
3 See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 229; Binder, supra
note 3, at 521.
36 Binder, supra note 3, at 522.
One of the strongest arguments Binder
offers in favour of his "dual culpability" theory
of merger is that it is already implicitly at work
in a majority of felony murder statutes in the
United States through the explicit enumeration
of felonies.3 ' Binder writes that legislatures use
what he terms a "covert merger limitation" in
enumerating only predicates "requiring suffi-
cient culpability to satisfy the principle of dual
culpability."3 Twenty-five of the forty-five felo-
ny murder jurisdictions enumerate predicate
felonies exhaustively, and of these twenty-five
only two allow assault of the victim to serve as
a predicates.39 In this way, Binder's concept of
"dual culpability" provides a compelling theo-
retical rationalization of existing state legisla-
tive frameworks.
Guilt disproportionality
Regardless of the philosophical justifi-
cations or rationalizations for the merger doc-
trine, the result is still that the more violent
and assaultive felonies become, the more likely
it is that they will merge with the homicide and
preclude the offender from being convicted of
first-degree murder on a felony murder theory.
This means that a hypothetical offender who
was committing a felony which does not in-
herently involve violence, such as burglary, and
whose only homicidal act was accidental (for
example, through the unintended discharge
of his or her firearm) could be convicted in a
state such as Florida of first-degree murder.
At the same time, any number of more intui-
tively morally blameworthy offenders such as
one who beats a child to death,40 could escape
first-degree murder liability, depending on the
exact parameters of the merger limitation used.
Id. at 543.
3 Id. at 550.
3 Id. at 544. The two states are Wisconsin and Ohio.
40 See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 236.
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Under a literal application of Finkelstein's "re-
descriptive" merger test, it is possible that even
the paradigmatic predicate of arson, itself an
intuitively blameworthy act, could "merge" out
of the scope of felony murder.4 ' Even leaving
aside the question of what proportional pun-
ishment for each of these offences would be,
from the perspective of relative culpability the
criminological framework set out by felony
murder and merger theories may result in rel-
atively more frequent first-degree murder con-
victions for offenders who have committed less
serious predicate felonies, as compared with
those who have committed more serious ones.42
Ferzan writes that it is "perfectly legiti-
mate" to limit the scope of felony murder lia-
bility to predicates such as rape and robbery
which are inherently dangerous.43 Without
challenging the validity of this statement, it
can nonetheless be said that felony murder,
as moderated by the merger doctrine (howev-
er defined), does exclude felonies that are not
only inherently dangerous but violent and as-
saultiVe by definition. The necessity of some
form of merger doctrine in maintaining a grad-
ed homicide system is obvious;4 4 however, the
ostensible price to be paid is that some acciden-
tal homicides result in death penalty liability
while others do not. More worrisome is that
this distinction does not always correspond
with the intuitive moral blameworthiness of
the underlying felony.
4' Ferzan, supra note 6, at 567.
'4 See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 219.
4 Ferzan, supra note 6, at 569.
" See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 227; see also Crump





The primary legislative response to the
United States Supreme Court's invalidation of
existing capital sentencing statutes in Furman
(. Georgia was the creation of lists of "statuto-
ry aggravators," usually numbering between six
and twelve in most states.45 Contemporaneous
felony aggravators ("CF aggravators") are aggra-
vating factors contained in sentencing statutes
that allow the fact that a first-degree murder
took place during a felony to weigh against the
defendant for sentencing purposes, both as the
one required minimum "gateway" aggravator
and when the jury is weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors.4 6 The CF aggravator, along
with the "vile murder" aggravator, leads to
more defendants becoming death-eligible and
to more carried-out death sentences than all
other statutory aggravators.
4 David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, & Charles A.
Pulaski, Jr., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 22 (1990).
46 In Florida's sentencing statute, the CF aggravator is
phrased as follows: "Aggravating factors shall be limited
to the following [ ... ] (d) The capital felony was commit-
ted while the defendant was engaged, or was an accom-
plice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit,
or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any:
robbery; sexual battery; aggravated child abuse; abuse
of an elderly person or disabled adult resulting in great
bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfig-
urement; arson; burglary; kidnapping; aircraft piracy; or
unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destruc-
tive device or bomb" (§ 921.141(6)(d)).
4 Allowing death penalty eligibility if it is established
that the murder was uniquely depraved in some way,
variously defined.
4' Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, supra note 44, at 22.
See also Cathleen Burnett, WRONGFUL DEATH SENTENCES:
RETHINKING JUSTICE IN CAPITAL CASES 86 (2010).
10 Washington College of Law Fall 2017
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The central problem this article seeks
to identify and explore is that the CF aggrava-
tor may be considered during sentencing for
first-degree murder convictions on a felony
murder theory, including ones that may be ex-
amples of "guilt disproportionality" due to the
merger doctrine (see above). The most obvious
objection to this -and one that has reached the
Supreme Court in Lowenfield regarding anoth-
er statutory aggravator-is that the CF aggra-
vator refers to the same factual matter as the
crime of first-degree murder itself when prov-
en on a felony murder theory.49 The fact of the
predicate felony appears, and can be disposi-
tive, at both guilt and sentencing phases. The
operation of the CF aggravator in felony mur-
der sentencing bypasses the jury's initial role
of finding the minimum "gateway" aggravator,
while at the same time potentially creating a re-
verse onus for the convicted felony murderers
to adduce mitigating circumstances in order to
avoid death.0
See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 232, 232 (1988).
o See White v. State, 403 So.2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1981). See
also Teffeteller v. State, 439 So.2d 840, 846 (Fla. 1983).
The habit of some scholars and even judges to refer to
the CF aggravator simply as "felony murder" contrib-
utes to the sense that statutes such as Florida's create
an automatic death penalty for first-degree murder
convictions on a felony murder theory. See, e.g., Sara
Col6n, Capital Crime: How Calfornia'sAdministration of
the Death Penalty Violates the Eighth Amendment, 97 CAL.
L. REV. 1377, 1413 (2009); Binder, supra note 3, at 519;
Burnett, supra note 47, at 95. In its decision in Lukehart
c. State, the Florida Supreme Court makes reference to
the "felony murder aggravator." 776 So.2d 906, 925 (Fla.
2000). To a layperson or to a capital defendant this
may well lead to the not-entirely-mistaken understand-
ing that a conviction for felony murder leads inexorably
to the death penalty.
Purpose Confusion: Defining the "Target"
of the CF Aggravator
In the context of felony murder, one ex-
ample of the "dual culpability" theory of merg-
er is the felony of burglary, for the purpose of
assaulting someone within the domicile. Here,
an assaultive or homicidal intention motivates
the felony of burglary in the first place. Un-
der both Finkelstein's more permissive "rede-
scriptive" test and Binder's "dual culpability"
test, described above, this is a paradigmatic ex-
ample of a non-merged felony.5' Though from
a historical perspective, burglary is well-estab-
lished as a predicate felony,52 it nonetheless is
useful to inquire as to what the penological
or punitive rationale is for allowing burglary
to serve as a predicate for the elevated crime
of felony murder. Binder notes that one Or-
egon court stated that the purpose of felony
murder liability in cases of burglary-assault
leading to homicide is to provide added pro-
tection for people in dwelling places, presum-
ably through general deterrence. Similarly,
the New York Court of Appeals cited deter-
rence-based reasoning about the particular
vulnerability of victims in homes.54 Similarly,
in the context of homicidal child abuse, the
predicate felony seems like assault and there-
fore a prime candidate for merger. However,
it is not merged, a result that Binder's "dual
culpability" analysis rationalizes not in terms
of independent felonious purpose but rather
independently culpable attitudes: the necessity
for punishing the indifference or hostility to-
wards the interests of a vulnerable individual
such as a child.5 Thus, the predicate felonies
" See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 236; Binder, supra
note 3, at 537.
2 Binder, supra note 9, at 190.
Binder, supra note 3, at 537.
* See Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 226; Crump &
Crump, supra note 18, at 380.
" Binder, supra note 3, at 524.
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of child abuse and burglary can be understood
not simply as separate acts apart from the ac-
cidental homicide, but as proxies, respectively,
for other forms of culpability.
The question of the "target" of the pu-
nitive and deterrent effects of felony murder
sentences raises important and troubling con-
cerns about the operation of the CF aggravator
in capital felony murder cases.Whatspect/ically
is the added capital liability created by the ag-
gravator meant to punish, or deter, apart from
the elements of felony murder itself already
considered at the guilt stage? In Carter c. State,
the Florida Supreme Court suggested that a
jury could give additional weight to the CF
aggravator for the appellant's burglary when
deciding on the appropriate sentence for the
two intentional murders he committed with-
in, but not when deciding on the appropriate
sentence for the accidental killing of his in-
tended victims' daughter when his gun unex-
pectedly discharged.6 According to the court,
the reason for this is that assaulting them was
Carter's goal in unlawfully entering the home
in the first place.57 However, in a hypothetical
situation in which the sole homicide was the
accidental death of the daughter, this descrip-
tion of the valid "target" of the deterrent effect
of the CF aggravator- Carter's unlawful entry
into the home in the first place-is less com-
pelling. In other words, a defense of the CF
aggravator that relies specifically on connect-
ing the motive of a (premeditated) murderer
in committing a felony to the eventual homi-
cide may falter when called upon to justify the
use of the CF aggravator for felony murder-
ers. These could include offenders who either
cannot be said to have had the necessary mens
rea for premeditation due to lack of neces-
C Garter c. State, 980 So.2d 473, 483 (Fla. 2008).
57 Ia.
sary evidence, as in Menendez v. State,58 or for
whom the evidence strongly suggests a mere
accident, as in Rembert c. State.59
This concern over the intended "target"
of deterrence or punishment exists for other
statutory aggravators as well. Garnett argues that
the additional deterrent effect of the "heinous,
cruel, and depraved" aggravator, as opposed to
that of a non-aggravated first-degree murder
conviction, is questionable because its "target"
is the would-be-murderer's conscience.6 0 The
content of what this aggravator communicates
about a first-degree murder is simply that it is
"bad"-a normative statement that one would
expect to be a given if the case has reached
capital sentencing, and therefore of question-
able value as a "discretion-narrowing device"
required by post-Furman sentencing statutes.6'
Garnett contrasts this with the common aggra-
vator that the murder victim was a police offi-
cer.62 Garnett suggests that this aggravator does
succeed in communicating something discrete
about the crime distinct from a mere descrip-
tion of the underlying offence to "filter through
to the consciousness of a prospective killer in
a way that might make him think twice" about
committing specific acts.3 For example, the po-
" Menendez v. State, 419 So.2d 312, 314 (Fla. 1982). An
eyewitness saw Menendez emptying a safe in a jewelry
store, but there was no direct evidence of Menendez
having killed anyone in the robbery. The store clerk's
body was later discovered and police retrieved items
from the store in Menendez's apartment.
" Rembert c. State, 445 So.2d 337, 338 (Fla. 1984). Rem-
bert entered a fishing supply store and hit the elderly
shop owner once on the head in order to gain access to
the till. The victim died hours later from gradual blood
loss.
60 Richard W Garnett, Depravity Thrice Removed: Using
the 'Heinous, Cruel, orfDepraced"Factor toAggravate Con-
ictions ofNontriggermen Accomplices in Capital Cases, 103
YALE L.J. 2471, 2495-96 (1994).
"6 Id at 2482; See also Lowenfield c. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,
232 (1988).
62 Garnett, supra note 60, at 2495-96.
63 Id
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lice victim aggravator may indeed cause a would-
be capital defendant to think twice before firing
a weapon in the direction of a police officer as
part of an attempt to avoid arrest during a felony
gone wrong, if we are to assume that this would-
be murderer is familiar with the state's capital
sentencing statute.
Just as the "heinous, cruel, and de-
praved" aggravator is broad enough to be mere-
ly a normative restatement of the wrongfulness
of first-degree murder as such,'6 4 the CF aggra-
vator is simply a repackaging of the factual mat-
ter underlying a felony murder conviction in
the first place. Arguably, there is nothing the
CF aggravator could deter or punish apart from
that which is already deterred or punished by
the operation of the felony murder rule at the
guilt phase of the trial. Returning to the bur-
glary-homicides at issue in Carter c. State, the
guilt-phase jury had already "used" the discrete
form of culpability based on Carter's violation
of the interest in property and the security of
his victims' domicile as a basis for singling out
the accidental killing of his victims' daughter
from the pool of all accidental homicides to re-
ceive the additional symbolic and penal oppro-
brium of a first-degree murder conviction on
a felony murder theory. From the perspective
of the scholarly accounts here, this much is le-
gitimate. However, it is less easy to justify the
second use of the discrete form of culpability
reflected in the act of burglary to single out for
capital punishment this (accidental) first-de-
gree murder, this time from the complete pool
of all first-degree murders, including premed-
itated murders. As Binder suggests, felony
murder is itself an "aggravator," increasing lia-
bility for an unintended killing to liability for
64 Id. at 2 482 .
6 See Crump & Crump, supra note 18, at 379-80;
Finkelstein, supra note 4, at 226; Binder, supra note 3, at
537.
first-degree murder on the basis of a felony.6 6
Accordingly, Lowenfield presents compelling
arguments that the same factual matter should
not be permitted to "aggravate" an accidental
homicide to murder and then "aggravate" that
murder to death-eligible murder.
Equal Protection Challenges
The jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court of Florida provides examples of cas-
es in which capital defendants have attempt-
ed to mount constitutional challenges to the
sentencing statute under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. An early
example of this is White c. State. The defendant
in that case was one of a group of men who
shot and killed six individuals during a home
invasion-style robbery.67 On appeal to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court, the defendant claimed that
the CF aggravator violated equal protection
rights for defendants who were convicted on
a felony murder theory of first-degree murder.
This was because the factual matter underly-
ing a felony murder conviction would almost
always engage the CF aggravator automatical-
ly: "the [felony murderer] enters the sentenc-
ing hearing with one aggravating circumstance
already in existence . . . while in contrast the
individual who has committed murder with a
premeditated design to take the life of his vic-
tim has no such aggravating circumstance held
against him."6 " The effect of this, according to
White, was that the state paradoxically had to
prove more against a premeditated murderer
at the sentencing phase than against a felony
murderer. Put another way, the felony murderer
carries a heavier evidentiary burden of adduc-
ing evidence of mitigating circumstances rela-
tive to the premeditated murderer. The Florida
66 Binder, supra note 3, at 519.
W7 hite v. State, 403 So.2d 331, 332 (Fla. 1981).
68 Id at 335.
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Supreme Court responded to White's equal
protection claim with an argument founded
on the internal logic of the state's capital sen-
tencing statute: "the fact that the mitigating
circumstances listed in section § 921.141(6) are
not exclusive removes much of the force of the
defendant's equal protection argument [ ... ] a
defendant remains free to argue as a mitigating
circumstance that he did not intend to kill the
victim ... the mere existence of an aggravating
circumstance does not mandate imposition of
the death sentence." 69
This is an unsatisfying response to a
compelling constitutional claim identifying a
real concern about Florida's capital sentencing
statute. Indeed, a felony murderer is as free as
a premeditated murderer to adduce mitigating
circumstances at sentencing. In addition, it is
true that the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to kill is available to felony murderers
but not to premeditated murderers.o However,
the fact remains that in the unlikely but rea-
sonable hypothetical case in which there are no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances other
than the CF aggravator, the premeditated mur-
derer could potentially avoid the death penalty
altogether whereas the felony murderer could
potentially face death. Further, the conceptual
uncertainty as to the "target" of the deterrent
effects of the CF aggravator, discussed above,
raises concerns about whether this weighting
of the scales against felony murderers at sen-
tencing is actually worth anything in the pur-
suit of a state's legitimate penological goals.
Admittedly, it is not clear that the Equal
Protection Clause was the appropriate vehicle
for developing a constitutional challenge to
the CF aggravator. The first hurdle that White
would have faced, had the Florida Supreme
6 Id. at 336.
70 Id.
Court engaged substantively with the merits of
his equal protection claim, would have been es-
tablishing Fourteenth Amendment protection
in the first place under the strict "disparate
impacts" standard set out in Washington c. Da-
vYis." Without going too far into the Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence at issue, if the Su-
preme Court was willing to reject a "disparate
effects" claim relating to a class (African-Amer-
icans) putatively at the core of Fourteenth
Amendment protection 2 it is hard to imagine
that a court would be willing to entertain a chal-
lenge to the use of the CF aggravator at felony
murder sentencing on the basis of disparate
effects alone. Had White somehow established
that the Equal Protection Clause was engaged
by the CF aggravator's disparate adverse im-
pacts on felony murderers, he would still have
had to establish that this discriminatory effect
was not justified, which would almost certainly
have been decided under the state-friendly "ra-
tional relations" standard of scrutiny. It is easy
to imagine a state attorney general constructing
an argument based on an appeal to the state's
legitimate interest of deterring the commission
of dangerous felonies.
In Mills Y. State, the Florida Supreme
Court responded in greater depth to the appel-
lant's constitutional challenge to the CF aggra-
vator in a felony murder case. 3 Interestingly,
the court rejects Mills' equal protection claim
in the rhetoric of deference to legislative de-
cision-making reminiscent of the paradigmatic
rational relations cases: "[t]he legislative deter-
mination that a first-degree murder that occurs
in the course of another dangerous felony is an
aggravated capital felony is reasonable."4 This
" See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
1976).
Id at 239.
1 See Mills v. State, 476 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1985).
Id at 178.
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deference to legislative wisdom about felony
murder's seriousness is problematic. Even ac-
ademic authors defending the continued exis-
tence of felony murder present their defenses
in terms of the corparability of felony murder
with premeditated murder, not the relatively
greater seriousness or moral blameworthiness
of felony murder. As Crump and Crump write,
felony murder reflects the "widespread public
perception that a [felony] resulting in death is
not simply a more serious version of the un-
derlying felony, but is a qualitatively different
crime, comparable in seriousness to other mur-
ders."7 5 In this formulation, the fact that felony
murder involves the death of the victim of a
felony (or a third party during a felony) distin-
guishes it in terms of moral blameworthiness
from non-homicidal felonies; it does not dis-
tinguish it in terms of moral blameworthiness
from premeditated murder in a way that justi-
fies a more onerous sentencing procedure for
felony murderers.
Lowenfield Challenges and Duplication
A challenge to the operation of statu-
tory aggravators, which is related to but dis-
tinct from equal protection claims, reached the
Supreme Court of the United States in and
Lowenfield c. Phelps.6 In Lowenfield, the Court
held that a death sentence does not violate the
Eighth Amendment simply because the one
statutory aggravator found "duplicates" an el-
ement of the underlying conviction." In this
case, the defendant had killed five people, and
challenged his death sentence in Louisiana on
the grounds that the "multiple victim" aggrava-
tor simply duplicated a factual element of the
underlying offence of quintuple murder. The
majority opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist
* Supra note 18, at 396.
6 See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 232 (1988).
77Id.
rejected this appeal, holding that aggravating
circumstances are not an end in themselves,
but instead "a means of genuinely narrowing
the class of death-eligible persons and thereby
channeling the jury's discretion," as required
by Zant c. Stephens.' Chief Justice Rehnquist
held that the required narrowing took place at
the guilt phase when the defendant was found
guilty of the particular crime of murder with
"specific intent to ill or to inflict great bodily
harm on more than one person."79
Unsurprisingly, Justices Marshall and
Brennan offered a strong dissent in Lowenfield,
and a number of the criticisms they articulate
there in reference to the "multiple victim" ag-
gravator are equally applicable in the context
of the CF aggravator. Marshall and Brennan be-
gan by arguing that, contrary to the majority's
opinions, the Court's previous cases did in fact
reflect the principle that the sole aggravator
cannot duplicate an element of the underlying
offence and still make the offender death-eli-
gible.o The dissenters then stated the obvious:
due the "complete overlap" of the factual mat-
ter contemplated by an element of a crime with
that contemplated by a statutory aggravator, the
sentencing hearing inevitably tilts towards the
imposition of the death penalty."' Marshall and
Brennan sought to show specifically how com-
monly- duplicative aggravating circumstances
such as the "multiple victim," "vile murder,"
and CF aggravators prejudice the defendant
at sentencing. The state "enters the sentencing
hearing with the jury already across the thresh-
old of death eligibility" -by virtue of the ele-
ments of the crime itself- "without any aware-
ness on the jury's part that it had crossed that
7 Id at 2 4 4 .
SId
SId. at 255 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting.)
SId at 258.
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line."82 At sentencing, the state will then face
less resistance in arguing for death because it
can remind the jury that it already found an
aggravator by convicting the defendant at the
guilt phase." Even worse, aggravator "duplica-
tion" affects the guilt phase of the trial too: as
a matter of human psychology, the prosecution
will have an easier time convincing the jury of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury re-
mains unaware that finding that element will
automatically make the defendant death-eligi-
ble at sentencing.4
Lowenfield-type "duplication" claims rep-
resent a preferable basis on which to challenge
the consideration of the CF aggravator in felony
murder cases; unlike Fourteenth Amendment
challenges, they do not chance the United States
Supreme Court's state-friendly equal protection
jurisprudence. Whereas equal protection chal-
lenges might fail by basing their claims on a
comparison of felony murderers and premedi-
tated murderers, Lowenfield "duplication" chal-
lenges make an appeal to the core concern of
post-Furman capital sentencing, the jury as "the
guardian and articulator of society's moral code
and conscience in the criminal trial."85 In fact,
Marshall and Brennan seem to express their
point in explaining how duplicative aggravators
bring the unwitting jury "across the threshold
of death eligibility" as much in terms of institu-
tional respect for the jury as of fairness to the
defendant.8 6 Perhaps this represents a strategy
of "calling the bluff" of death penalty advocates
who defend capital sentencing by pointing to
the process of guided jury discretion as a bul-
wark against arbitrariness.
82 Id
" Id. at 257-58 (discussing that the prosecutor at trial
twice reminded the sentencing jury of precisely this
fact.
84 Id at 24 7.
a Schwartz, supra note 15, at 867.
8 See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 258.
The CF aggravator is troubling precisely
because of its mechanical, non- discretionary op-
eration in felony murder cases. Garnett argues
that the "heinous, cruel, and depraved," aggra-
vator "is so emotionally loaded and conceptu-
ally amorphous that it may fail as a check on
arbitrary sentencing." Thus, whereas criticism
of "vile murder" aggravators focuses on their
potential for abuse of discretion and arbitrari-
ness, the criticism of the CF aggravator could
be stated as the inverse: for felony murderers,
the CF aggravator operates too "automatically"
and mechanically, making a defendant eligible
for the death penalty by virtue of the underlying
elements of his crime proved at the guilt phase.
In fact, the danger of "automatic" death pen-
alty eligibility caused by the CF aggravator in
felony murder cases may actually be greater in
real terms than the danger of "arbitrary" death
penalty eligibility caused by the "heinous, cru-
el, and depraved" aggravator. While trial courts
could potentially mitigate the amorphousness
and over-inclusiveness of the "heinous, cruel
and depraved" aggravator by statutory inter-
pretation," this "reading down" logic simply
does not apply to the CF aggravator. As a sim-
ple matter of logic, the aggravator is engaged
whenever the first-degree murder conviction
rests of a felony murder theory. Barring some
procedural limit to the availability of the CF ag-
gravator when the first-degree murder convic-
tion rests on felony murder theory (see below),
it is possible that the aggravator will act as the
"gateway" circumstance (the minimum of one
aggravator required for all death eligibility) and
permit the jury to proceed to the more opaque
process of weighing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
8 Garnett, supra note 60, at 2480.
8 See David Pannick, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEATH
PENALTY 97 (1982).
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Again, the felony murderer is always free
to adduce a lack of intent to kill as a mitigating
circumstance,8 9 which may well be compelling
to a jury alongside other mitigating circum-
stances. However, regardless of whether felony
murderers in fact do receive death sentences
primarily because of the CF aggravator, it ex-
poses them to the greater possibility of a death
sentence, and to the contingencies and vicissi-
tudes of jurors' subjective views on the weight
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, all
of this in effect because of their lack of premed-





In light of the proportionality concerns
related to felony murder as a theory of first-de-
gree murder, perhaps the most obvious possi-
ble reform is to eliminate the death penalty as a
punishment for those convicted of first-degree
murder on a felony murder theory. This reform
would exclude felony murder from the scope of
what constitutes a capital offence, continuing
on the trajectory of the Court decision in Coker
(. Georgia, which excluded rape from the cate-
gory of capital offences.90 As noted above, the
California Commission on the Fair Administra-
tion of Justice, in its 2008 final report, recom-
mended taking a step further along this path by
excluding felony murder from eligibility for the
death penalty.9'
However, this essay proposes the more
modest reform of prohibiting the consideration
" See, e.g., White v. State, 403 So.2d 331, 336 (Fla.
1981).
Coker v. Georgia, 433 US 584, 598-560 (1977).
0 CAL. COMM. ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., supra note
16, at 138-39.
of the CF aggravator when the first-degree
murder conviction is based on a felony murder
theory, in keeping with the ideal of "dual culpa-
bility" sentencing. In effect, this reform would
separate out the respective lists of available ag-
gravating circumstances in sentencing statutes
depending on whether the first-degree murder
conviction rested on a premeditation or felony
murder theory, creating two parallel tracks for
capital sentencing. Just as Binder's "dual cul-
pability" formulation of the merger doctrine
requires a discrete type of culpability aside
from violating the victim's interest in physical
integrity,92 "dual culpability" sentencing would
require a felony murderer to have demonstrat-
ed culpability in more than the way captured
by the felony murder conviction itself Under
Florida's sentencing statute, this required sec-
ond form of culpability could take a variety of
forms: that the defendant is a gang member,
that the victim was a police officer, child, per-
son with a disability, or public official, that the
murder was committed to avoid arrest, or any
other form of culpability encapsulated by the
other remaining available aggravators.9'
If applied in a state such as Florida, this
sentencing scheme would prevent juries from
considering the CF aggravator at the sentenc-
ing stage in any cases where there is a possi-
bility that the jury found a capital defendant
guilty of first-degree murder solely on a felo-
ny murder theory-in other words, whenever
there is not the "separate" culpability of pre-
meditation in addition to the culpability relat-
ed to the felonious purpose. If applied in Flor-
ida, this category would include cases in which
the conviction rested solely on a felony murder
theory such as Menendez94 or Rembert 9 5 or cases
9 See Binder, supra note 3, at 519.
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West 2017).
1 See Menendez v. State, 419 So.2d 312, 314 (Fla. 1982).
" See Rembert v. State, 445 So.2d 337, 337 (Fla. 1984).
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in which the jury returned a general verdict at
the guilt phase and did not specify whether the
first-degree murder conviction rested on a pre-
meditation theory or a felony murder theory,
such as Hurst Q. Florida.9 6
As Col6n notes, restricting the array of
statutory aggravators with an eye to reducing
the overall number of death sentences "could
result in a statutory policy which would not
necessarily reflect the values of the communi-
ty."97 However, prohibiting the consideration of
the CF aggravator in felony murder cases would
be only a continuation along the states' prog-
ress on legislative reform in the post-Furman
era, rather than a change in kind. The Supreme
Court has rejected the categorical approach to
capital sentencing, which would automatically
inflict the death penalty on certain categories of
crimes, such as the murder of children or po-
lice officers.98 As suggested by Koch et al., as a
matter of state-level political debate on criminal
sentencing, advocates of the death penalty are
able to leverage the legislative efforts to restrict
death penalty liability to "the most despised of-
fenders" to counter the rhetorical advantage of
pro-abolition advocates in calling the penalty
uncivilized or random.99 However, the legislative
narrowing of death penalty liability through
statutory aggravator requirements also increas-
es the gulf between inchoate public sentiment
on the moral blameworthiness of particular of-
fenders and the eventual results in capital tri-
als. Put simply, laypersons reading about a cap-
ital case in the newspaper-and the pro-death
penalty state legislator-are not constitutional-
ly obligated to consider and weigh mitigating
96 See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616, 620 (2016).
" Col6n, supra note 50, at 1413.
9 Larry W. Koch, Colin Wark & John E Galliher, THE
DEATH OF THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY: STATES STILL
LEADING THE WAY 167 (2012).
99 Id.
circumstances, unlike the post-Furman capital
juror. Outside the capital sentencing process,
laypersons can ignore mitigating circumstanc-
es at will, focusing on the most provocative and
disturbing elements of the crime. Seen this way,
post-Furman capital statutes, including aggra-
vating and mitigating factors, are at the same
time an attempt to channel and control the
public's inchoate and visceral intuitions on who
deserves the death penalty and therefore also a
negation of the value of those intuitions as le-
gitimate determinants of actual sentences.100
As capital sentencing stands now, a ju-
ror's own views about the proportionality of
death as punishment are relevant only insofar
as they fit into the process of guided discre-
tion. Courts no longer look to the rationality
and even-handedness of sentencing decisions
themselves, but only to their procedures.101 In
the post-Furman era, the results-oriented in-
quiry into proportionality, if it ever existed, has
been transformed into an ongoing assessment
of procedure.102 As Baldus et al. note, and as the
compounding of guilt disproportionality and
sentencing disproportionality demonstrates,
seeing sound procedure as coextensive with
fair and proportional sentencing requires a
leap of faith not always justified empirically.10 3
Though it would have a disproportion-
ate impact on the number of death sentences
imposed,0 4 the modest reform of excluding the
CF aggravator from capital sentencing of felony
murderers' cases would simply be an extension
of the logic of guided sentencing that would not
100 See Lowenfield c. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 257; See also
Bessler,supra note 1, at 283.
101 Baldus, supra note 44, at 26.
102 Id
103 Id at 27.
104 See Franklin E. Zirning, The UnexaminedDeath Pen-
alty: CapitalPunishment and the Reform of the Model Penal
Code, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1396, 1403 (2005); Baldus,supra
note 44, at 22.
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fundamentally change the relationship of state
legislatures to the capital jury in exercising its
discretion. The epochal change has already
taken place, in the Furman shift to guided dis-
cretion and automatic appellate review.105 The
moral impulse of just deserts has been eclipsed
by procedure as a concrete manifestation of
the goals of morality and proportionality.106 As
Garnett writes, "[a]ggravating factors, properly
applied, should and can insure that only the
most blameworthy defendants are sentenced to
death."'7 Denying a "death-qualified" jury and
the state the expedience of the CF aggravator
when sentencing a felony murderer could help
to make this ideal a reality.
"' See Bessler, supra note 1, at 283, 326; Baldus,supra
note 44, at 26.
106 Baldus, supra note 44, at 26.
10' Garnett, supra note 59, at 2493.
Washington College of Law 19Fall 2017
15
Dutcher-Walls: Aggravated Disproportionality: The Merger Doctrine, Contemporaneo
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015
Criminal Law Practitioner
CASES CITED
Carter v. State, 980 So.2d 473 (Fla. 2008)
Coker v. Georgia, 433 US 584 (1977)
Ennund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016)
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988)
Menendez v. State, 419 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1982)
Mills v. State, 476 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1985)
Rembert v. State, 445 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1984)
Teffeteller v. State, 439 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1983)
Washington v. Davis, 426 US 229 (1976)
White v. State, 403 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1981)
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983)
Washington College of Law20 Fall 2017
16




Baldus, David C., George Woodworth, and Charles A. Pulaski, Jr. EqualJustice and the Death
Penalty:A Legal andEmpiricalAnalysis. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990.
Bessler, John D. Cruel and Unusual: The American Death Penalty and the Founders'Eighth
Amendment. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2012.
Binder, Guyora. "The Origins of American Felony Murder Rule." StanfordLaw Review 57.1 (2004):
59-208
Binder, Guyora. "Making the Best of Felony Murder."Boston UniversityLawReview 91 (2011):
403-559.
Burnett, Cathleen. WrongfulDeath Sentences: Rethinking Justice in Capital Cases. Boulder, CO.
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.
California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice. Calfornia Commission on the Fair
Administration ofJustice Final Report. Palo Alto, CA: Threestory Studio, 2008.
Col6n, Sara. "Capital Crime: How California's Administration of the Death Penalty Violates the
Eighth Amendment." Calfornia Law Review 97.5 (2009): 1377-1417.
Crump, David and Susan Waite Crump. "In Defence of the Felony Murder Doctrine."
Harvard JournalofLaw andPublicPolicy 8.2 (1985): 359-398.
"Felony Murder as a First Degree Offence: An Anachronism Retained." Editorial.
Yale Law Journal 66.3 (1957): 427-435.
Ferzan, Kimberley Kessler. "Murder After the Merger: A Commentary on Finkelstein."
Buffalo CriminalLaw Review 9.2 (2006): 561-575.
Finkel, Norman J. and Stefanie E Smith. "Principals and Accessories in Capital Felony-Murder:
The Proportionality Principle Reigns Supreme." Law & Society Review 27.1 (1993): 129-
156.
Finkelstein, Claire. "Merger and Felony Murder." Defining Crimes: Essays on The Special Part of the
CriminalLaw. Ed. R.A. Duff and Stuart Green. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Garnett, Richard W. "Depravity Thrice Removed: Using the 'Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved"
Factor to Aggravate Convictions of Nontriggermen Accomplices in Capital Cases."
Yale Law Journal 103.8 (1994): 2471-2501.
Koch, Larry W., Colin Wark, and John E Galliher. The Death ofthe American Death Penalty:
States StillLeading the Way. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2012.
Pannick, David. JudicialReview ofthe Death Penalty. London: Duckworth & Company, 1982.
Washington College of Law 21Fall 2017
17
Dutcher-Walls: Aggravated Disproportionality: The Merger Doctrine, Contemporaneo
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015
Criminal Law Practitioner
Sudduth, Tamu. "The Dillon Dilemma: Finding Proportionate Felony-Murder Punishments."
Calfornia Law Review 72.6 (1984): 1299-1327.
Schwartz, Douglas W "Imposing the Death Sentence for Felony Murder on a Non-Triggerman."
Stanford Law Review 37.3 (1985): 857-888.
Zimring, Franklin E. "The Unexamined Death Penalty: Capital Punishment and Reform of the
Model Penal Code." ColurnbiaLaw Review 105.4 (2005):1396-1416.
22 Washington College of Law Fall 2017
18
Criminal Law Practitioner, Vol. 3 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol3/iss4/2
Criminal Law Practitioner
Washington College of LawFall 2017 23
19
Dutcher-Walls: Aggravated Disproportionality: The Merger Doctrine, Contemporaneo
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015
